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We  build  on  systems  integration  literature  to  explain  how  and  why  knowledge  integration  of  non-
modular  products  is  based  on  a strategic  choice  between  internalizing  and  outsourcing  core R&D.  The
under-researched  choice  of  outsourcing  core R&D  on an on-going  basis  appears  to face  risks  of higher
transactions  costs  and  loss  of control.  We  illuminate  these  choices  in  a  comparative  analysis  of  two
longitudinal  cases  that  compare  an internally  focused  R&D  intensive  ﬁrm  and  an  externally  focused  R&D
intensive  ﬁrm;  and  we show  how  the  externally  focused  approach  can  avoid  risks  by framing  non-modularroduct systems
&D outsourcing
nowledge integration
roduct systems capability
nter-ﬁrm coordination mechanisms
outsourcing  as  modular  even  though  it is  not  so  and  by engaging  in a social  process  of  communication  to
achieve  a common  agreement  between  partners  concerning  the  direction  of  efforts  and  thus  effectively
reduce  highly  iterative  knowledge  exchange  between  modules.  Our  ﬁndings  add to our understanding  of
the systems  integration  literature;  the  nature  of ﬁrm  product  system  strategies,  as  well  as  ﬁrm  boundaries
in a  knowledge  economy.
ublisiotechnology ©  2016  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
There is an increasing trend for new products to be developed
n networks of specialized ﬁrms because the pace of technology
evelopment is so fast that no single ﬁrm can have the resources to
andle all the necessary development in-house (e.g. Powell et al.,
996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Hobday et al., 2005). In these
etworks, a focal ﬁrm takes on the “role” of product system inte-
rator. This role involves dividing up and allocating innovation and
anufacturing tasks along the value chain to network partners or
n-house teams and putting in place relevant structures and con-
rols (e.g. Hobday et al., 2005; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011).
Hitherto, studies of product system integrator roles have
ocused on modular products. Modular products can be decom-
osed functionally, spatially and physically thereby deﬁning
recisely the link between components in a way that allows inter-
aces to be speciﬁed beforehand (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001; Hobday
t al., 2005; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011). Modularity facilitates cost
ffective outsourcing because on-going partner interdependencies
an be coordinated efﬁciently. Roles (that deﬁne the part played
y each actor) are agreed on the basis of modules; and decision
ights are agreed on the basis of accountability or responsibility, and
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
the necessary empowerment achieved module by module. In addi-
tion, because module interfaces are fully speciﬁed there is timely,
relevant and credible communication between module actors (e.g.
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Pavitt, 1998; Brusoni et al., 2001). In
the case of a modular system, the product system integrator needs
a diverse scientiﬁc and technological knowledge base sufﬁcient to
support the necessary knowledge ﬂows and cross-domain linkages,
but not so great as to know everything that is undertaken by part-
ners (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; Prencipe,
1997; Brusoni et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; Padgett and Powell,
2003; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rothaermel et al., 2006). By
knowledge base, we  mean the bodies of knowledge or understand-
ing and practice that underpin product design and manufacturing
efforts which the product system integrator has mastered i.e. can
generate, use or interpret independent of its partners (e.g. Pavitt,
1998; Brusoni et al., 2001).
What is less understood and less researched are the consider-
able challenges that product system integrators face in outsourcing
development work for non-modular high technology products
which are underpinned by knowledge which is complex, ambigu-
ous and highly tacit – such as biotechnology drug development
(e.g. Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). By complex knowledge we
observe the (large) number of interdependent routines, individ-
uals, technologies, skill sets and resources that must be linked to a
particular knowledge asset (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Knowledge
is ambiguous in the sense that the links between the knowledge
and the desired outcome of a commercially viable product are
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nclear (Simonin, 1999). Knowledge is highly tacit in that it is
arely made explicit in the rapidly changing context of high tech-
ology product development (and it may  not be possible to make it
xplicit).
This means that there are challenges to outsource knowledge
or non-modular high technology products even when the prod-
ct development process follows distinct stages along the value
hain. The product system integrator has to cope with dense knowl-
dge ﬂows within and across product development stages and
cross domain linkages (e.g. Padgett and Powell, 2003; Brusoni
nd Prencipe, 2011); and has to face high coordination costs
nd a high risk of appropriation or opportunism in alliances (e.g.
hesbrough and Teece, 1996; Cassiman et al., 2005). The develop-
ent process is also likely to have complex overlapping division
f labor, needing regular and costly mutual adjustments that
re not easily resolved in an alliance setting (e.g. Padgett and
owell, 2003; Schreiner et al., 2009). Hence in non-modular con-
exts, it will be difﬁcult to achieve clarity in the role allocations
nd delegation of decision rights necessary for efﬁciency in man-
ging on-going partner interdependencies (e.g. Schreiner et al.,
009).
To address the aforementioned challenges, we  suggest that a
roduct system integrator has to take a strategic choice which is
ikely to be inﬂuenced by the predominant learning approach it
as taken or expects to take with alliance partners (e.g. Grant and
aden-Fuller, 2004; Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). The ﬁrst strate-
ic choice requires that the product system integrator internalize
nd integrate development stages and R&D under hierarchical con-
rol for efﬁcient integration and to save on coordination costs and
imit expropriation concerns (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996;
rant, 1996; Cassiman et al., 2005). In this strategy, external
ngagement by the systems integrator is largely conﬁned to either
on-core work, or to specialized or independent knowledge and
omplementary knowledge required to augment or spur inter-
al efforts (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Cassiman et al.,
005).
In contrast, the second and more externally focused knowl-
dge strategy is that the product system integrator will commit
o accessing core knowledge and development externally on an
n-going basis and to somehow mitigate the anticipated higher
ransaction costs and risks of loss of control it faces when engaging
xternal partners for product R&D (e.g. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller,
995; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004).
We therefore ask how and why product system integrators
ho externalize non-modular core R&D knowledge on an on-going
asis develop successful products comparable to internally focused
roduct system integrators. Additionally, how and why  are they not
eld back by expropriation and coordination costs concerns?
We study these questions in a research setting of high knowl-
dge intensity – namely biotechnology ﬁrms that interact to
iscover and develop drugs (e.g. Powell et al., 1996; Schweizer,
005). Our research employs a longitudinal case study approach
hat compares two biotech specialist drug development companies
hat are representative of each product system integrator’s strat-
gy choices: one that is internally focused in its R&D (e.g. Cassiman
t al., 2005); and another that is externally focused i.e. outsources
ts core R&D on an on-going basis. We  examine over seven years, the
evelopment of each ﬁrm’s knowledge, how their partner networks
re developed and the coordination mechanisms the two  strate-
ies employ to make knowledge integration a success – thereby
hedding light on the “role” of a product system integrator.
We ﬁnd that the externally focused ﬁrm’s own knowledge base
hough limited, can be complemented by speedily accessing exter-
al partners’ knowledge to successfully support innovative product
evelopment. The network structure is developed by outsourcing
evelopment stages to external partners – a division similar to thatrch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045
which is employed in modular systems. Coordination is exercised
sequentially over stages where roles and decision rights are con-
ferred to partners with capacity to undertake core R&D. In order
to reduce the amount of knowledge exchange between stages it
is helpful to achieve a common agreement concerning the direc-
tion of efforts. We hypothesize that this is done through a social
process of communication. That is, the main role of communica-
tion in this product system is to shape the efforts of partners rather
than to transfer knowledge. Communication which builds a com-
mon  socialization and offers leadership from the center mitigates
problems of contract incompleteness and conﬂict of interest with
the extended range of partners to whom core R&D is outsourced.
We  explain in some detail what each of these elements involve both
conceptually and empirically.
Our study deepens existing knowledge and reaches well beyond
past studies that have been based on cross sectional data and per-
ceptual measures (e.g. Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005; Jansen et al.,
2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), and have failed to capture the
different ways in which organization practices are used as knowl-
edge integration capabilities. The study also highlights important
implications for commercializing technology from academic and
public research labs which will often need particular integration
capabilities to actually make them work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a literature review, and Section 3 describes our methods.
Section 4 presents the case description and in Section 5, we  explain
how and why both product systems succeed; with conclusions pre-
sented in Section 6.
2. Literature review
When a product system integrator develops cutting edge prod-
ucts in networks of specialized ﬁrms, it acts as the knowledge
integrator, bringing together relevant partners and choosing where
and how to collaborate (e.g. Prencipe et al., 2003; Hobday et al.,
2005). As noted in the introduction, hitherto the product sys-
tems integration literature has focused on modular products in
which functions can be associated clearly with particular prod-
uct components and the interfaces between components are stable
and fully speciﬁed (e.g. Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Modula-
rity thus ensures cost effective outsourcing and coordination of
outsourced components to partners. In addition, the literature
notes that the role of product system integrator extends beyond
mere direction, it has to sense and understand how and whether
changes across components have a negative or positive impact on
knowledge integration during product development. This requires
a well-developed diverse knowledge base that comprehends the
development of individual components, as well as knowledge
underpinning the development of the product architecture (e.g.
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011).
There is, however, a gap in our understanding for the non-
modular context. Although non-modular high technology products
may  be developed in distinct development stages, the under-
lying knowledge does not have fully speciﬁed interfaces and
so requires a different outsourcing approach. The challenge is
ampliﬁed when there are differences in technology develop-
ment rates between developmental stages (e.g. Prencipe, 1997);
uncertainty in knowledge-product linkages, and underspeciﬁed
interdependences between product development stages. Therefore
the product system integrator has to frame its learning approach in
its alliances carefully, so as to manage dense knowledge dependen-
cies across components and domains (e.g. Grant and Baden-Fuller,
2004).
For an internally focused strategy, the density of inter-
dependencies between domains or components and within domains
or components is high. Hence the internally focused product system
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mploys hierarchical control to economize on coordination costs
nd to reduce risks of expropriation and opportunism (e.g. Cohen
nd Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006).
The externally focused product system integrator accesses part-
ers’ R&D expertise on an on-going basis, without necessarily
aving a primary desire to internalize that knowledge (e.g. Grant
nd Baden-Fuller, 2004); and this is underexplored in literature.
he extant literature gives strong clues about an externally focused
roduct system integrator’s role – i.e. it has to avoid high coor-
ination costs and high risks of expropriation and opportunism
e.g. Chesbrough and Teece, 1996; Grant, 1996). This means that
t has to consider (1) the number and type of partnerships in the
rm’s network (e.g. Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Baum et al., 2000;
othaermel and Deeds, 2004; Hobday et al., 2005) and (2) the
oordination mechanisms required for managing on-going part-
er interdependencies and the conveying of knowledge across ﬁrm
oundaries (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). And in making these
ecisions, the integrator’s role is to assemble an alliance portfo-
io where: (1) the partnerships are mutually compatible with the
ocal ﬁrm and with each other and that they are all supportive of
he mission, and (2) there are appropriate ﬁrm level monitoring
echanisms to coordinate activities and knowledge ﬂows across
ndividual partnerships (e.g. Hoffmann, 2007). Because these differ-
nces are likely to be greater in upstream (early stage – explorative)
ctivities than in mid-stream (mid-stage) activities, and because
ownstream (late stage – exploitative – close to market) activities
re likely to be undertaken by partners that have well developed
ystems to deal with partner interactions, we can anticipate the
oordination efforts required for product system integration roles
ill be greater in activities involving upstream than mid- and
ownstream partners (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006).
All of the above points explain what the product system inte-
ration role involves, but do not tell us how the system integrator
olves the coordination and monitoring challenge. Solving this
roblem requires understanding two different but interrelated
rganizational design decisions concerning role allocation and del-
gation of decision rights (Jansen et al., 2005; Schreiner et al., 2009;
oss et al., 2011). Role allocation is specifying the part that an
lliance partner or the focal ﬁrm plays in task execution. Delegation
f decision rights is the assignment of accountability or responsibil-
ty for task completion and the empowering of the assigned party
ith the authority to make particular decisions. For example, the
ecisions necessary for execution of the task as agreed between
he contracting parties or concerning changes or priorities involv-
ng the process or project (e.g. Schreiner et al., 2009; Foss et al.,
011).
Unclear roles and responsibilities impede the ﬁrm from effec-
ively managing inter-dependencies between partners through
n-going coordination and from dealing with inevitable unforeseen
ontingencies (e.g. Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Arino and De la
orre, 1998; Madhok and Tallman, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002;
uo, 2006). The clarity of role allocation and delegation of decision
ights depends on the extent to which dependencies between prod-
ct components or knowledge domains are stable and predictable.
When managing on-going partner interdependencies, relevant
nformation and knowledge needs to be communicated with part-
ers effectively, credibly and at minimal cost (e.g. Mohr and
pekman, 1994; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Das and Teng, 1998;
yer and Singh, 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001). Effective communi-
ation – deﬁned as the ‘formal as well as informal sharing of timely
nd meaningful information between ﬁrms’ (Anderson and Narus,
990: 44) – occurs when it assists in building a shared under-
tanding of obligations and engagement rules between partners
hat enables effective cooperation (e.g. Klimoski and Mohammed,
994). Communication may  also reduce the negative effects of
nformation asymmetry in alliances (e.g. Schreiner et al., 2009). Arch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045 1033
key communication mode is formal communication, such as sched-
uled project review meetings which are speciﬁed contractually in
the formal governance structure of collaborations or alliances. For-
mal  meetings provide essential assessment and feedback points for
R&D managers (e.g. Uzzi, 1997; Jansen et al., 2005; Schreiner et al.,
2009; Foss et al., 2011). However, previous research has also found
that informal communication – often conducted in social settings
between diverse R&D teams – to be critical, as contracts are neces-
sarily incomplete (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986) and cannot specify
in advance all the communication content that may be required in
a collaboration.
Conducive social settings and relations underpin any kind of
commercial and contractually-based relationship (e.g. Padgett and
Powell, 2003) and are developed through social bonding (e.g.
Schreiner et al., 2009) – mutual attraction and psychological link-
ages between individuals and ﬁrms. Social bonding is embedded in
professional relations and friendships based on reciprocity involv-
ing exchanges of different types depending on social and cultural
contexts to create and maintain relations (e.g. Padgett and Powell,
2003). Social bonding can be used as a conduit for creating and
maintaining expectations of mutual cooperation, sharing of knowl-
edge for mutual beneﬁt in alliances or for conﬂict resolution and
to help ﬁrms in an alliance to adapt as required in the face of
changes (e.g. Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). Social bonds are cre-
ated and maintained when individuals or ﬁrms expect to derive (1)
some instrumental value from their partners, such as getting access
to resources that help further one’s own  interests (e.g. Schreiner
et al., 2009), and/or (2) expressive beneﬁts, for example, to estab-
lish and maintain reputation (within and between organizations),
or getting recognition as a legitimate member of a subgroup or
ﬁrm (e.g. Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011). Examples of activities that
build social bonds ‘include providing reliable and timely responses
to a partner’s work-related needs, being proactively responsive
to its concerns, spending time on connecting with a partner and
remaining in frequent contact, as well as attending seriously to
their views, ideas, and circumstances so as to signal respect and
appreciation for the other’ (e.g. Schreiner et al., 2009: 1402). Often
the social bonding process involves going beyond the call of duty
and foregoing doing things for only short term gains (e.g. Schreiner
et al., 2009). When social bonding is built through socialization
processes, individuals (and ﬁrms) become psychologically linked
together in pursuit of a common goal and evoke in each other norms
of reciprocity that facilitate their work.
So, taken together, although the literature has identiﬁed (a) the
steps that the product system integrator has to undertake in form-
ing its alliance structure, and (b) the considerations it has to make
regarding the three constituent parts of the coordination mecha-
nisms required – role allocation and delegation of decision rights,
communication and social bonding – it has not clearly explained
how these elements work differently depending on which strat-
egy product system integrators adopt with regard to knowledge
development. In particular, it has not explained how the coordi-
nation mechanisms of product system integrators that externalize
their core R&D knowledge solve the huge anticipated coordination
issues involved on an on-going basis.
Put another way, the above knowledge tells us what mat-
ters, but it does not really answer the question “Will it work
in reducing transactions costs and solving coordination difﬁcul-
ties?”. So, this study explores how and why  product system
integrators that build knowledge using different R&D outsourcing
strategies develop knowledge bases that support successful knowl-
edge integration. We  also explore how product system integrators
adopting such different strategies develop their partner networks
differently and utilize different but appropriate coordination mech-
anisms to support their knowledge integration capabilities while
minimizing coordination costs. Fig. 1 depicts this conceptual
1034 D.S. Kamuriwo, C. Baden-Fuller / Resea
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tional information about their research collaborators and patterns
of engagement.
1 We conducted 6 interviews at Ehub with all senior managers, plus 3 follow upig. 1. Conceptual framework for successful knowledge integration in biotechnol-
gy.
raming, and shows the factors product system integrators take
nto account in successfully integrating knowledge in non-modular
ontexts.
We use case studies to illustrate these different development
atterns and have chosen the biotechnology sector as our setting.
e operationalize the concepts highlighted above and measure (a)
he extent to which each ﬁrm develops their knowledge – diver-
ity, amount and quality of knowledge and how each ﬁrm facilitates
elevant knowledge ﬂows across boundaries (b) the trajectory of
he development of the ﬁrm’s partner network – the number and
ype of its partners and what knowledge is accessed from each;
nd the direction of that trajectory – how the variables change
ver time, (c) the coordinating mechanisms each ﬁrm employs
e.g., allocation of roles and delegation of decision rights and how
ach ﬁrm communicates and develops and uses social bonds to
acilitate communication and minimize its coordination efforts and
osts).
. Methods
.1. The case study – basis of sampling
Past research looking at small ﬁrms’ product development
trategies generally (e.g. Ebben and Johnson, 2005) and at biotech-
ology’s drug development sector in particular (e.g. Haagen et al.,
007) suggests that there is a bipolar distribution of ﬁrms’ knowl-
dge building strategies. In the ﬁrst strategy, ﬁrms build internally
rganized R&D as their core capabilities (e.g. Powell et al., 1996;
othaermel and Deeds, 2004); in the second strategy, ﬁrms design
heir R&D efforts internally, but outsource the speciﬁc work to
heir external partners (e.g. Cavalla et al., 1997; Haagen et al.,
007; Chakma et al., 2009; Sabatier et al., 2010). Our own detailed
vidence on the UK sector reveals that, of a sample of 68 drug dis-
overy ﬁrms in the UK (which between them account for over 80%
f products under development), almost two thirds adopted the
rst strategy (i.e. the internally focused R&D approach) and the
thers adopted the second. We  found no examples of ﬁrms fol-
owing hybrid strategies i.e. mixing the two knowledge building
pproaches for different projects within the same ﬁrm. This bipolar
istribution has been observed not only in the UK, but also in France
e.g. Sabatier et al., 2010), Germany (e.g. Haagen et al., 2007) andrch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045
the USA (e.g. Chakma et al., 2009). Therefore, the externally focused
strategy for organizing R&D is not an outlier but is quite prevalent
and becoming increasingly so.
Given the two  contrasting pools of ﬁrm types, we followed a
theoretical sampling approach and identiﬁed two  ﬁrms which were
exemplars of each of these two knowledge development strategies
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Siggelkow, 2007). As is explained in
more detail below, we then investigated and tracked the two  ﬁrms
using interviews, internal documents and other external sources
to identify their organizational processes, mechanisms and log-
ics. To limit bias and retrospective sense making, our interviews
involved numerous highly knowledgeable informants, as well as
managers from different hierarchical levels and functional areas
(e.g. Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).
Our sample case companies – anonymized as Avertical and Ehub
– are UK based dedicated biotechnology ﬁrms, both founded in
1998. Avertical’s product development approach involved building
an extensive R&D laboratory and hiring in-house scientists (over
eighty full time employees by 2005) to cover the range of value
chain activities required for its product development efforts, as
well as accessing speciﬁc knowledge elements externally through
alliances and contracting (see Table 1). Ehub, on the other hand,
hired comparatively few staff, all highly experienced executives
(nine by 2005) who  designed its R&D studies – in collaboration
with carefully selected partners – and then outsourced all relevant
R&D activities, ﬁrstly on a local and then, progressively, on a global
basis (see Table 2). The progress of both ﬁrms was highlighted by
outside commentators as they successfully negotiated the pre and
post-millennium ‘boom and bust’ periods.
3.2. Data collection
We  collected data through 27 interviews and secondary sources
(see Table 3 for a detailed breakdown of the data sources, types and
their use in analysis). The interviews were with management team
members in the two case ﬁrms, industry experts and managers at
other related companies such as service ﬁrms and venture capi-
talists. The interviews included seven follow up interviews as well
as visits to the company premises and (often iterative) telephone
and email contact over a three-year period.1 All key interviews
with the two subject companies were transcribed: in other cases
we usually used recordings, but sometimes only took detailed
notes.
We supplemented the primary and secondary interviews with
data from company documents, including detailed ﬁnancial reports
of the companies (ﬁled for each year of each ﬁrm’s existence),
some internally produced product proﬁle reports, archived press
releases, a history of all of each company’s deals as recorded inter-
nally and checked with Bio Century Database, websites of the
companies and via other web searches. We searched the US patent
ofﬁce database for all their patent applications (whether granted or
not) and studied the patent reports and applications to retrieve con-
tent, inventors, technology classes, citations, etc. We also searched
for all research articles published by the companies’ scientists
and by those linked to the companies through sponsorship and
other formal collaborations, which allowed us to trace publications
about their research collaboration exhaustively, and yielded addi-interviews with three of them after about a year. We conducted 5 interviews with
the top managers at Avertical, plus 4 follow up interviews with four of them about
a  year later. We interviewed 4 managers at service companies that dealt with the
companies, 2 biotech industry consultants and 3 biotech venture capitalists.
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Table  1
Avertical summary company description.
Time period 1998–2000 2001–2003 2004–2005
Number of employees
Admin 1 13 13
R&D  and operations 9 66 70
Total  operating exp/year £1.2m £9m £12m
Funds  raised £1.5m £18m £20m
Patents granted (13 applications:
all patent inventors were company
employees)
2
Knowledge stocks Intellectual property (IP) from
founding university; technology
platform and data; experienced
founders: six prominent scientists
Hired 2 experienced R&D managers
including new CFO; acquired genetic
company
Hired 2 experienced R&D managers
Product  pipeline 2 main projects: antivirals and
antibacterial at discovery stage
Lead candidate in preclinical stage and
3 others in lead optimization stages
Lead candidate in clinical Phase I; one
candidate in preclinical stage and 2
others in earlier stages
External partnering
Alliances 7 2 1
Contracting 5
Publications total 6 7
Internal research effort 1 1
Co-authored – univ/rl 1 3
Co-authored – company 1
Sponsored research – univ/rl 3 3
Table 2
Ehub summary company description.
Time period 1998–2000 2001–2003 2004–2005
Number of employees
Admin 1 4 6
R&D  and operations 1 1 3
Total  operating exp/year £1.2m £1.2m £4m
Funds  raised £2m £12m £20m
Patents granted (14 applications –
all  patent inventors were NOT ﬁrm
employees but employees of
partner ﬁrms)
2 4
Knowledge stocks IP from NERC; hired experienced
managers
Hired experienced managers
including new CEO
Hired experienced managers
including new CFO
Product pipeline 4 possible projects at discovery
stage
Lead candidate in preclinical
stage and 3 candidates in
earlier stages
Lead in Phase I; 2 other
candidates in preclinical stage
and one in earlier stages
External partnering
Alliances
Contracting 5 9 14
Publications total 2 7 5
Internal research effort
Co-authored – univ/rl 1
Co-authored – company
Sponsored research – univ/rl 2 7 4
Table 3
Data sources and their use.
Data sources Type of data Use in the analysis
Semi-structured interviews (27
interviews in total)
Interviews at Ehub: 6 interviews at Ehub with all 6 senior
managers, plus 3 follow up interviews with three of them
after about a year
Interviews at Avertical: 5 interviews with the top managers
at Avertical, plus 4 follow up interviews with four of them
about a year later
Interviews with other relevant actors: 4 managers at service
companies that dealt with the companies, 2 biotech
industry consultants and 3 biotech venture capitalists
Reconstruct how R&D was  organized
Reconstruct the historical, organizational and institutional
context within which R&D organization decisions were
taken and implemented
Integrate and cross check accounts from managers with
those from partners or other industry experts
Secondary sources Company documents: detailed ﬁnancial reports of the
companies (ﬁled for each year of each ﬁrm’s existence),
product brochures
Press releases for each ﬁrm: for the years 1998–2005 and all
company deals from BioCentury Database
Patents: applications and granted for the years 1998–2005
in  the US patents ofﬁce
Scientiﬁc publications: company afﬁliated and sponsored
research for the years 1998–2005
Support, integrate and cross check accounts from
semi-structured interviews
Gather information on partners, knowledge metrics
Track media coverage of the development of each ﬁrm and
its  partnerships and deals
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Table  4
Internal and external knowledge sources by value chain stage in Company-Avertical and Company-Ehub.
Value chain stage Avertical with examples Ehub with examples
Drug discovery: (1) target ID and
validation; (2) lead screening; (3)
lead optimization
Hired scientists and developed a
well-equipped laboratory, but also developed
alliances with 4 universities and 7 service and
biotech companies.
“In biology terms, we have a strong cell biology
group, strong virology group, molecular biology
support”
“Our early collaborations with Inpharmatica,
Tripos and Replizyme provided us with small
areas of expertise that we later on ﬁlled in-house”
Hired a highly experienced R&D executive who
designed studies and outsourced R&D work to
5 universities.
“At our peak in the early phases we had access to
six scientists at Oxford University. We  also
worked with four or ﬁve academic researchers
around the world”
Preclinical trials
(medicinal/pharmaceutical
chemistry, toxicology, animal model
studies, etc.)
Hired scientists in relevant disciplines and
developed laboratory further. Hired senior
R&D managers. Made three alliances with
biotechnology ﬁrms.
“We can do combinatorial chemistry, we can do
medicinal chemistry, we can do scale up
chemistry, so we can supply material for
preclinical development, so we can take it to a
certain stage. We  have the ability to do
chemically almost anything”
Hired executive with R&D experience.
Continued development of lead candidate
drugs with external partners – specialist
service companies and public research
laboratories.
“We  worked with companies that specialized in
manufacturing materials and companies that
specialized in analyzing and all these kind of
things we did externally”
Clinical trials Hired two  experienced R&D managers to
manage the outsourcing of work to major
contract research organizations.
“We  actually manage our outsourcing very
actively, we  design the studies, manage them
very closely, and inﬂuence very much what’s
being done. CROs are always, however much you
 from 
Hired two experienced R&D executives to
manage the outsourcing of work to contract
research organizations and public research
laboratories.
“Initially we went to one of the big contract
research companies, Quintiles”
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a portfolio up to 8 projects with a 50–50 focus on the two main
therapeutic sub-segments as shown in Fig. 2. After 2003, Avertical
refocused its portfolio to only anti-viral products, and shelved its
anti-bacterial programs altogether, because the anti-viral programs
2 We used the standard industry classiﬁcations – e.g. Giovannetti and Morrison
(2000): 46–47 – that consists of the following distinct stages: (1) drug discovery;
(2)  pre-clinical trials; (3) three sets of clinical trials; (4) FDA review and approval;
(5) Launch – post-marketing testing, manufacturing, distribution. We also noted
that  the discovery stage has three sub stages: (1) target ID and validation; (2) lead
screening; (3) lead optimization. The preclinical stages require capabilities in testingtalk to them, more distant
requirements”
.3. Case analysis approach
Our analysis was based on a systematic investigation of sam-
le cases (e.g. Chandler, 1962), with the overall aim of trying to
nderstand how R&D was organized in the case ﬁrms. Data to
upport underlying variables under investigation was based on
oth quantitative and qualitative evidence obtained and triangu-
ated from multiple sources (Jick, 1979) in a process designed to
dd an extra layer of respondent validation (Silverman, 1993).
nformation obtained from each contact or secondary source was
ummarized against target questions and constructs: these summ-
ries were used to identify gaps in information that could be
lled by further on-going interviews or other pertinent secondary
ources (e.g. Miles and Huberman, 1994). The analysis across the
wo cases broadly compared their knowledge building approaches
ased on the biotechnology product development stages deﬁned
y Rothaermel and Deeds (2004).
We  noted which R&D product development stages were devel-
ped in-house and which were outsourced. We  longitudinally
racked each ﬁrm’s R&D product development systems and used
abular data displays to understand each ﬁrm’s R&D organization
s a stand-alone entity. As we were comparing two  case ﬁrms
hat integrated knowledge successfully, cross case comparison also
dentiﬁed and veriﬁed which knowledge was integrated in each
ase. So we constructed tables that compared several product
evelopment stages using their value chain categories across the
wo cases, and also noted similarities and differences between the
ases, juxtaposing qualitative and quantitative evidence to ensure
hat our conclusions were stronger and better grounded.
In the next sections we present our detailed case descriptions
nd ﬁndings. Section 4.1 is a brief comparison of the two ﬁrms’
roduct system strategies and presents the differences in their
nternal and external knowledge sources at each value chain stage
hrough which new products are developed. Sections 4.2 and 4.3
resent in detail each ﬁrm’s knowledge development pattern. In
ection 5 we discuss how and why product system integrators asa company’s
typiﬁed by our ﬁndings in the case studies integrate knowledge
through R&D outsourcing successfully.
4. Case description
4.1. Comparing the two ﬁrms’ knowledge development patterns
by analyzing value chain stages
We  employ the standard (pharmaceutical) industry value chain
classiﬁcation to analyze the extent of each ﬁrm’s investment in par-
ticular product development stages,2 and follow Rothaermel and
Deeds (2004) classiﬁcation of the biotechnology product devel-
opment value chain, and we  report the results of our analysis in
Table 4, and discuss them in detail below.
4.2. Avertical’s knowledge development system
At its founding in 1998, Avertical’s target markets within the
class of anti-infective medicines were the sub-segments of anti-
viral and anti-bacterial drugs.3 By 2003 Avertical had developeddrug  candidates but also areas of specialized medicinal/pharmaceutical chemistry,
toxicology, etc.
3 Anti-infective drugs are those that kill an infectious agent or inhibit it from
spreading. Anti-viral and anti-bacterial drugs are sub-classes of medication designed
to  treat viral or bacterial infections respectively.
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ere making faster scientiﬁc progress. This shift meant reorgani-
ing the company, downsizing R&D staff numbers from a peak of 70
n early 2004 to about 50 by late 2005, and adopting a ﬂatter organi-
ational structure by removing a whole layer of management (see
ig. 2). After this move, according to senior managers, Avertical’s
&D capabilities were ‘at the cutting edge of science’  and targeted
novel markets’ and its lead therapeutic ‘RSV’4 was a novel ‘ﬁrst in
lass’ drug candidate. Assessing Avertical’s situation suggests it was
eveloping high technology (using the Hobday et al., 2005, classiﬁ-
ation) and that the knowledge that underpinned the development
f its products was complex and ambiguous (e.g. Rothaermel and
eeds, 2006).
Table 4 shows, Avertical initially (i.e. 1998–2000) depended
n seven external partners for its upstream activities and (after
000) progressively developed core in-house R&D capabilities. Its
pstream R&D partners were three small companies: Inpharmat-
ca (a specialist provider of bioinformatics data), Tripos (Avertical’s
upplier of chemistry in its early days) and Replizyme (a special-
st assaying service provider); and four universities that provided
pecialist services, including chemistry and assaying. As its CEO
xplained, these early collaborations ‘provided us with small areas
f expertise that we later on ﬁlled in-house’.
Within a few years of its founding (i.e. 2000), Avertical had
eveloped a wide range of in-house R&D capabilities to tackle
oth upstream and mid-stream activities: as its Research Director
xplained:
4 Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) causes infection of the lungs and breathing
assages, and is a major cause of respiratory illness in young children.y capability areas of Avertical.
‘. . .we  are not limited to a speciﬁc functionality like some
companies. . .we have the ability to do chemically almost any-
thing. In biology terms, we  have a strong cell biology group,
strong virology group, molecular biology support. . .’
Avertical also had three mid-stage collaborations – with Virogen
Inc., Triangle Pharmaceuticals and Acambis – exchanging intel-
lectual property rights (IPR) and sharing development costs – a
stance that was in line with its predominant learning approach in
alliances i.e. engaging with partners with knowledge transfer as the
goal. Avertical’s learning approach in alliances, role allocation and
delegation of decision rights was also evident in the terms of agree-
ments to exchange IPRs, where each ﬁrm would pledge to use their
internal capabilities to incorporate the other’s IPRs, and to choose
– independently – promising technology that they would jointly
fund going forward.
Avertical’s managers believed that having in-house upstream
core R&D capabilities allowed the ﬁrm to make changes quickly in
response to new evidence, communicate ﬁndings easily, and build
an environment where the co-located scientists from multiple dis-
ciplines can exchange ideas easily – often informally but overall
in keeping with its predominant learning strategy where the focus
was to spur internal knowledge development. As one of Avertical’s
managers said:
‘. . .we  need to have chemists and biologists to be working in
the same building, having coffee together and talking. And that’s
how we  get good research on-going.’
Avertical took a different approach to managing its down-
stream activities; all of which were outsourced and managed by
senior project managers. The CEO explained that the UK funding
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nvironment made it impossible for a small venture to ﬁnance late
tage development capabilities in-house – i.e. to conduct clinical
rials, manufacture and market their products. However, since large
harmaceutical companies have very sophisticated organizations
or late stage clinical development, manufacturing and market-
ng, but relatively poor research productivity, Avertical saw itself
s a good strategic complement to such companies: as the CEO
xplained:
‘I see us as a company providing that expertise in the early stage
research. And the large Pharmaceutical companies providing
us with expertise in late stage development and the marketing
expertise so that we don’t have to.  . .which is the major expense
in drug development.’
Avertical had a consistent policy toward managing its partner-
hips. Each major external partnership had an oversight board with
verall strategic responsibility for the deliverables in the agreement
nd there would be regular oversight meetings at which key stake-
olders would present progress reports. These structures allowed
eam members to meet and socialize, a process that led to fur-
her informal contacts through the phone or other media. In fact,
ne of the directors said that any real knowledge transfer arising
rom alliances depended on how their researchers took advantage
f social contacts (just as described by Liebeskind, 1996).
.3. Ehub’s knowledge development system
From the time of founding in 1998, Ehub’s focus was  innova-
ive anti-inﬂammation therapeutics. Its technology came from a
rominent national public research laboratory in Oxford, where
he company’s scientiﬁc founder was director in charge of work
n vector5 saliva and its role in the transmission of pathogens.6
he globally acclaimed technology was pioneering and complex
ecause it involved extracting tick saliva molecules for use as
otential anti-inﬂammatory drugs using emerging recombinant
echnology. Working with scientists from different laboratories,
hub’s key challenges included how to isolate saliva molecules
rom a tick – which is obviously a pretty tiny beast – and to accu-
ulate ﬁrst grams and then kilos of such materials for discovery
esearch. Further research carried out by key collaborators involved
ecombinant technology, and it included identifying pharmacolog-
cal activities, and understanding how disease and infection are
ontrolled at the molecular level.
The knowledge-product linkage ambiguity was high and like
ost biotechnology ﬁrms, Ehub sought to resolve this risk by
ommissioning its technology in many different application areas
ith research groups around the world.
Ehub also paid particular attention to its patenting strategy, as
ts CEO explained:
‘[Essentially] the strategy is to try to patent the biology source, to
patent the means of discovery of the agents and then to patent
the agents themselves. And then when the activity in human
beings is observed for the ﬁrst time, to patent that mode of
treatment again. So you have actual substance of matter patents
through to use patents. And the whole purpose of this was to
try to get a reasonable lifetime for the overall patent.’
Organizationally, in keeping with its learning approach in
lliances of primarily accessing rather than seeking to transfer
nowledge from partners, Ehub allocated R&D roles through a
road range of research agreements targeting different therapeutic
5 An organism, typically a biting insect or tick that transmits a disease or parasite
rom one animal or plant to another.
6 Anything that can transmit disease such as a virus or bacteria.rch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045
applications in the anti-inﬂammation domain (see Fig. 3 for project
portfolio range).
As said earlier, in contrast to Avertical’s management and staff
structure, Ehub employed only a small number of experienced
managers, who outsourced all of Ehub’s R&D by working collab-
oratively with carefully selected partners to design studies and
commission external development for each and every stage in
the drug development value chain (as shown in Table 4). The
approach was  knowledge access rather than knowledge transfer,
which meant that Ehub’s partners were fully empowered to under-
take core R&D work and provided specialized product development
work, each typically focusing on a particular value chain stage. We
stress, Ehub had no in-house laboratories and employed no bench
scientists.
Upstream – Ehub set up its ﬁrst upstream research agreement
to outsource basic R&D with the founding national research lab-
oratory from where it sourced its primary IP. The terms of the
agreement required the founding public research laboratory to
carry on basic R&D on speciﬁed applications and sign over to Ehub
any IP resulting from the research, in return for R&D funding, a
promise of a single digit royalty stream if the resulting technol-
ogy came to market, and an equity consideration in Ehub. Ehub
signed similar agreements with other academic units both in the
UK, and around the world in areas such as Slovakia and Brazil (all
involving scientists who had previous co-working experience with
the founding scientist). Ehub managers reported that these non-UK
agreements were much cheaper than its original UK research agree-
ment – as they did not involve giving up equity, the royalty stream
being much smaller (about 2%) and the scientist were funded at
about a tenth of the equivalent UK cost.
Mid-stream – Ehub’s midstream work involved testing one of
the recombinant molecules with an animal model. Initially, Ehub
approached major contract research organizations (CROs) such as
Quintiles, but later it moved to working with Centre Nationale pour
Reserche Scientiﬁque (CNRS) in Orleans, France, and later on at the
Ophthalmic Research Associates Inc., North Andover, MA,  USA. The
Development Director explained these academic units and smaller
companies were considered more responsive:
‘What you got [from large CROs] was what came straight out
of the shelf, they weren’t interested in sitting down with you
and trying to deliver exactly what it was  you were looking for
or to modify the way  they did things or something like that. . .
and it’s usually quite expensive and in many cases it just didn’t
work or it wasn’t quite what you wanted. And so [after a while]
we started going much [more] generally to smaller companies,
not [necessarily] paying [them], and also to academic units.’
Downstream – In a similar pattern to Avertical – Ehub relied
on contract research organizations to outsource late stage devel-
opment and employed a couple of senior managers as project
managers to oversee their activities. As with Avertical, Ehub’s selec-
tion process for engaging late stage development (clinical trials)
partners was  formalized into a very structured tendering process
that was typically geared to drive down costs. As the Development
Director explained:
‘. . . all contractors sign a conﬁdential agreement and a techni-
cal agreement on the back of a commercial contract describing
what they should perform. This is backed by a rigorous selec-
tion process based on capability, quality, experience and track
record and availability. In addition, our ability to outsource on
a global basis gives us competitive prices.’
We  obtained evidence in our ﬁeld work that Ehub created ‘ﬁrm
type intimacy’ by building relational capital with employees of
development partners and that they exploited factors such as sim-
ilarity in size of ﬁrms and orientation to reinforce the intimacy. For
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xample, one of Ehub’s managers stated that ‘relations with indi-
idual employees of development partners are more important than
ith the ﬁrm itself’. Building relations involved making frequent
isits to partner premises that were not necessarily scheduled for-
ally, helping the partners with equipment purchases possibly
eeded in the course of research, facilitating attendance at sci-
ntiﬁc conferences and funding research activities. It seems that
hub understood the importance of project management skills in
erms of engaging and communicating to partners formally as well
s holding them to account, as one R&D executive said:
‘And there was a lot of interest in these proteins so some people
were prepared to do things for nothing. So [over time] we  tried
to ﬁnd people that were good but would be doing things for
interest rather than for money. And we formed some good long
lasting relationships that way.’
. Findings concerning knowledge integration strategies in
on-modular contexts
Pavitt (1998), Padgett and Powell (2003) and Brusoni and
rencipe (2011) explain that successful knowledge integration is
ased on the ﬁrm’s ability to own or access diverse scientiﬁc and
echnological disciplines – that is bodies of knowledge or under-
tanding and practice – that underpin the ﬁrm’s product design and key capability areas of Ehub.
manufacturing. This involves facilitating dense knowledge ﬂows
and cross domain linkages that aid innovation and knowledge
building (e.g. Padgett and Powell, 2003; Brusoni and Prencipe,
2011) and also aid in sensing, absorbing and integrating external
knowledge (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
As the Avertical case indicates (please refer to Fig. 4), for
the internally focused product system integrator, core in-house
multi-discipline R&D knowledge consisting of diverse scientiﬁc
and technological disciplines, underpins product development for
the upstream and mid-stage value chains. The co-location of
in-house multi-discipline R&D enables the product system inte-
grator to facilitate dense transactional knowledge ﬂows and cross
discipline linkages necessary for innovative activity within and
across these early product development stages – an approach that
is consistent with its predominant learning framing of transfer
of knowledge. Hierarchical control is employed to cost effec-
tively manage coordination of in-house cross boundary knowledge
ﬂows.
For external partners, consistent with its predominant framing
of transfer of knowledge, Avertical’s approach as revealed in Table 1
mentioned earlier, shows its capacity to transfer dense external
knowledge ﬂows by the extensive co-authorships and citations in
scientiﬁc publications and patents between the ﬁrm’s scientists
and other organizations (measures explained to be important by
Liebeskind, 1996). Additionally, Avertical’s alliances leveraged its
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nternal R&D expertise to engage in exchange of IPR deals which
ere used to spur its internal efforts.
For the externally focused product system integrator there is a
uzzle concerning how it can develop a product system with high
nnovation levels, with a relatively low knowledge base. Ehub had
 low knowledge base because it had no laboratories and no sci-
ntiﬁc publications, however, it owned many patents because they
ere legally ascribed to Ehub by virtue of its scientiﬁc and tech-
ological agreements (see Table 2). And as expected, consistent
ith its learning approach in alliances, the afﬁliations of inven-
ors on Ehub’s patent list (applied for and granted) were external
gents rather than employees. Traditionally, it has been assumed
hat an integrator needs to have deep knowledge to support cross-
oundary knowledge ﬂows (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To
xplain this paradox, we argue below that a product system inte-
rator frames its knowledge as modular, even though it is not
ctually modular (see Fig. 5). This permits the accessing of knowl-
dge rather than knowledge transfer (e.g. Grant and Baden-Fuller,
004).
.1. Framing complex, seemingly non-decomposable knowledge
s modular
Although products may  be complex (because they are pioneer-
ng and based on emerging technology) and ambiguous (they havetional internally focused strategy.
uncertain knowledge-product linkages), the externally focused
product system integrator can frame knowledge to support its
product system as essentially modular – i.e. not in the sense
that interfaces were fully speciﬁed as would be expected in
multi-technology physical products, but that cross domain or
cross product stage dependencies and hence knowledge ﬂows
were deemed to be not so dense as to render outsourcing too
costly. And this framing relies on the concept of analogical rea-
soning (e.g. Gavetti and Rivkin, 2005). When ﬁrms take existing
innovations from other contexts (that may  have failed or suc-
ceeded) and transplant them into a different context, they may
choose to use those ﬁndings as external (objective) reference
points to decide on the likely trajectory of product development
in the new setting (e.g. Gavetti and Rivkin, 2005). Where such
external references exist, they may  be used by product system
integrators to justify initial hypothesis about the likelihood of the
importance of cross domain or product stage dependencies and
therefore whether to frame development as essentially modular or
not.
The Ehub case illustrates the above points. Ehub’s technology
involved extracting tick saliva molecules from their natural envi-
ronment where ticks are known to feed stealthily on their hosts
without being detected. Ehub executives believed that the tick
stealth feeding process – successful in its natural environment –
could serve as a reference point to pioneer a therapeutic application
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or humans. The executives – who were scientists themselves –
hen combined their experience and expertise to help design stud-
es in the new setting of developing human therapeutics, as Ehub’s
&D executive explained:
‘Partly it was intuitive, in other words, if you knew that the tick
wanted to stop [its] host from scratching, you knew the types
of pathways that it would be trying to interfere with and one
of the obvious ones was the histamine pathway. . .because his-
tamine is one of the earlier substances released in the skin which
causes itching. So it was obvious that the tick had to be able to
do something to histamine. So the scientists went to look for
molecules that would bind onto histamine and sure enough they
were there.’
Additionally, Ehub’s CEO explained how they designed the stud-
es in collaboration with its partners by drawing from known
cientiﬁc ﬁndings or existing knowledge to determine mechanisms
f action in subsequent stages:‘Just at a simple level what we knew was that the particular
pathways obviously had to be suppressed with the immune
system and basically we had a procedure which enabled us to
discover the mechanism of some of these drugs and some ofexternally focused strategy.
them worked on some pharmaceutical agents that we knew to
be interesting but in novel ways.’
The use of external reference points allows the development
system to be streamlined by providing starting points in hypotheses
development which obviate the need for dense cross stage knowl-
edge ﬂows but still allow the integrator to access very specialized
knowledge within each development stage. The Ehub example
shows how a product system integrator can frame a complex seem-
ingly non-decomposable problem as modular – thereby allowing
separation of development stages. The framing means that the
anticipated knowledge ﬂows between development stages are low
even though the knowledge within each product development
stage is quite complex and cutting edge.
Thus, in summary we propose that:
A product system integrator with a relatively low knowl-
edge base and limited capacity to support cross boundary
transactional knowledge ﬂows and cross domain linkages can
still successfully produce products that require complex and
ambiguous knowledge by accessing specialist partner knowl-
edge. This strategy requires the product system integrator
to frame its knowledge requirements for the product system
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as modular by using compelling reference points that lessen
the necessity of dense cross development stage transactional
knowledge ﬂows.
.2. Framing the learning approach to network structure
evelopment
The internally focused product system integrator has few
pstream or mid-stream external partners. In contrast, the network
tructure of the externally focused system integrator involves out-
ourcing product development stages to partners – a division of
abor in which a product development stage is linked to a relevant
etwork partner with the necessary knowledge. Our case studies
lso showed how the development of the network structure occurs.
Both types of product system integrators are likely to start with
any external partners. Consistent with its framing of learning
ithin alliances, the internally focused product system integra-
or progressively relies less on (the number of) external partners
ver time. The ﬁnding whereby externally accessed knowledge is
rogressively substituted with in-house R&D teams, echoes other
iotech industry studies (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rothaermel
nd Deeds, 2006) or that of the literature on organizational learn-
ng (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Powell et al., 1996; Zahra and
eorge, 2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006).
onsistent with conventional ﬁrm boundary literature, hierarchical
ontrol is employed to curtail opportunism and reduce coordina-
ion costs (e.g. Grant, 1996). The consequence of this strategy is,
ver time to conﬁne the ﬁrm’s R&D outsourcing only to non-core or
pecialized and discrete complementary knowledge areas to reduce
pportunism and to minimize coordination costs (e.g. Chesbrough
nd Teece, 1996; Cassiman et al., 2005).
In contrast, an externally focused product system integrator
elies on external partners to access high value core R&D (e.g.
ubatkin et al., 2001; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004). The network
rows as the product system integrator allocates tasks to ﬁll the
ndustry value chain. Rather than substituting its partners’ capabil-
ties with in-house R&D teams, the integrator’s reliance on partners
s on-going. The core of the externally focused product system inte-
rator does grow, not to substitute partner R&D expertise but to
ncrease the focal ﬁrm’s capacity to manage its network: thus an
xternally focused system integrator doesn’t grow in employee
umbers as fast as in an internally focused one.
In particular, we propose that:
When high technology products can be supported by mainly
modular knowledge for their development, the network struc-
ture can be developed by outsourcing each development stage
to a different external partner.
.3. Solving the coordination challenge
Following Padgett and Powell (2003) and Brusoni and Prencipe
2011), organizing the network involves linking work programs
 decomposed into projects or contracts as visible elements of
etwork tasks. This requires clarity of role allocation and delega-
ion of decision rights so that product system integrators manage
ffectively on-going interdependencies and address the inevitable
nforeseeable contingencies (Schreiner et al., 2009). Clear role allo-
ations and decision rights help the product system integrator to
ope with the expected dense transactional ﬂows of information,
rtifacts and people across domain or organizational boundaries by
owering coordination costs. Unclear roles, procedures and respon-
ibilities impede the ability of the product system integrator to
apitalize on specialized but interdependent activities of partners
Thompson, 1967).rch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045
Our case studies show these processes at work. The internally
focused product system integrator allocates core R&D inter-
nally under hierarchical control; and manages ﬂexibly the dense
dependencies between product stages or knowledge domains
in upstream and mid-stream value chain stages, leveraging the
beneﬁts of internalized R&D decision rights (e.g. Chesbrough
and Teece, 1996; Cassiman et al., 2005; Rothaermel and Deeds,
2006). Co-location of R&D teams improves effective communi-
cation and develops a conducive social setting. Flexibility can
be enhanced further by a ﬂatter organizational structure that
allows management to act quickly and ﬂexibly by for exam-
ple reconstituting R&D teams as new evidence comes to light.
Formal communication is through scheduled management, team
leader and project review meetings but also unscheduled meetings
that can be arranged as necessary. Additionally, socialization tac-
tics include facilitating informal meetings and managing ﬂexible
career paths for juniors to move between departments as they are
promoted.
In the externally focused product system integrator, role allo-
cations and delegation of decision rights are allocated on the basis
of outsourcing development stages to partners with the capac-
ity to undertake core R&D in those stages. In addition, allocating
core R&D work in relatively big chunks to partners with multidisci-
plinary teams and capabilities helps the externally focused product
system integrator to conﬁne dense interactions within a develop-
ment stage to a single partner and hence save on coordination costs.
Moreover, to further limit cross stage dependencies, work mostly
proceeded on a stage by stage basis i.e. sequentially coordinated
from upstream to mid-stream and then downstream (e.g. Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967).
Although it has only a handful of executives at its core, commu-
nication is both through formalized channels such as project review
meetings and informal social channels when project managers pay
often unscheduled visits to partner laboratories. Unlike in inter-
nally focused product system integrators, where communication
is used primarily to facilitate transfer of knowledge, communi-
cation in externally focused system integrators is used mainly to
shape product development efforts of partners. Ehub chose part-
ners who  could provide customized solutions rather than off-the
shelf projects.
Communication through informal social channels was  facili-
tated through appropriate social bonding developed by a wide
range of tactics. Starting from the experience base of executives and
founders, Ehub’s early partnerships were with research laborato-
ries where scientists had a past work or academic afﬁliation with
the founders. In addition, social bonding was  developed through
proactively meeting the needs of their partners through making
relevant investments in upgrades of partner technology or capac-
ity improvements to create and develop mutual appreciation. By
actively engaging in selling Ehub’s vision of its projects, the poten-
tial of its technology, and presenting partners with a credible
prospect of funding and sharing intellectual property (IP) with
them, and highlighting what they could all achieve together by
collaborating, the ﬁrm was able to create a climate for positive
engagement by signaling respect and appreciation for each other. In
addition, partners were deeply involved in project design because
the commissioning ﬁrm’s initial hypothesis was often initially at a
very broad level. Therefore the development of projects required a
lot of responsiveness from partners where development proceeded
over many long visits involving sharing and responding proactively
to each other’s needs. The focal ﬁrm would often provide funding or
purchase required equipment that would not be readily available,
facilitate conference or event sponsorships or meetings or intro-
ductions required in the course of development – thus responding
to their partner’s development concerns but also using the time to
connect socially.
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Summarizing our discussion, we suggest that the two prod-
ct system integrator types have different but consistent product
ystems whose elements of coordination: role allocation and del-
gation of decision rights, communication and social bonding are
eveloped to align with its approach to learning in alliances within
he network alliances. Speciﬁcally we propose that:
For the internally focused product system integrator, role alloca-
tion and delegation of decision rights of core R&D to co-located
multidisciplinary R&D teams use hierarchical control to ﬂexibly
manage the anticipated dense transactional knowledge ﬂows
across boundaries and reciprocal coordination of development
stages. External partners are engaged based on the complemen-
tarity of knowledge that partners bring to product development.
For internally focused integrators, the goal of communication
is speedy, timely and accurate information sharing within and
across in-house project teams and from external partners. The
goal of social bonding is to facilitate knowledge transfer as well
as mitigate problems of knowledge sharing between in-house
teams and external partners.
For the externally focused product system integrator, roles and
decision rights are mapped to product development stages
and allocated to partners with the capacity to undertake core
R&D and coordination of development is a sequential stage by
stage process with relatively low anticipated cross development
stage/boundary knowledge ﬂows. Communication is used for
assessing project progress and exchange information that helps
shape the direction of future efforts. The objective of communi-
cation by the integrator is to shape the efforts of partners by
reaching a common agreement about the direction of future
efforts rather than to transfer knowledge, and the main goal of
social bonding is to provide leadership from the center and the
necessary conditions to mitigate problems of contract incom-
pleteness and conﬂicts of interests with the extended range of
partners to whom core functions of R&D are outsourced.7
. Conclusion
Although the literature has emphasized that successful knowl-
dge integration is based on how product system integrators
everage external knowledge sources (e.g. Arora and Gambardella,
994; Chesbrough, 2003; Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005; Cassiman and
eugelers, 2006), it has not spelled out how integrators can use
xternal knowledge differently. We  describe two  basic choices: in
he ﬁrst, the product system integrator type relies on in-house core
&D upstream and mid-stream to accelerate new product develop-
ent through the effective transfer of relevant external knowledge
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This is in contrast to the second route
here the product system integrator relies on externally sourced
ore R&D on an on-going basis for all stages and all activities.
Our study shows that an externally focused knowledge build-
ng strategy based on heavy reliance on external partners is much
ore than just a transitional arrangement for the development of a
rm’s core capabilities in R&D (e.g. Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). It
hould not be seen as risky and unwise (e.g. Chesbrough and Teece,
996; Tether and Tajar, 2008; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010; Zirpoli
nd Becker, 2011) but rather that the strategy is an exemplar of
ushing the envelope of boundaries to accessible R&D outsourc-
ng (e.g. Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Our study shows how and why
uch a product system integrator can build valuable knowledge that
esults in successful product innovation; how and why its orga-
izational arrangement of relying on partners is stable enough to
7 We thank the editor and an anonymous reviewer for this insight.rch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045 1043
support growth; and how and why  such a ﬁrm can indeed solve
the coordination problems inherent in managing on-going part-
ner inter-dependencies efﬁciently, when they involve complex and
ambiguous knowledge ﬂows. In making these claims we build on
product system integration literature which views product systems
as those which relate knowledge strategy choices of the ﬁrm to
the pattern of development of the system i.e. the manner the focal
ﬁrm integrates product components, assembles the network struc-
ture and coordinates the network to achieve innovative outcomes
(Hobday et al., 2005; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011).
We also use two longitudinal in-depth studies of “exemplar”
ﬁrms to show how things work in practice. We have established
that product system integrators have different ways of successfully
integrating knowledge in a context where the non-modularity of
the activities makes outsourcing of R&D both potentially costly to
manage and risky. The two  ﬁrms in our study achieved compara-
ble product innovation outcomes, either owned or accessed diverse
scientiﬁc and technological knowledge necessary to develop prod-
ucts. We  ﬁnd that though the knowledge base of the externally
focused product system integrator is relatively smaller, its product
system outcomes are not stunted by the greater on-going external-
ization of its R&D.
The externally focused product system integrator’s smaller
knowledge base has lower capacity to support dense cross bound-
ary transactional knowledge ﬂows and the cross domain linkages
necessary for innovative product development (e.g. Padgett and
Powell, 2003; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2011). However, such an inte-
grator can still successfully produce products that require complex
and ambiguous knowledge by accessing specialist partner knowl-
edge in conditions where dense cross boundary knowledge ﬂows
are not crucial for product development and the ﬁrm can frame the
knowledge requirements as modular.
The framing of knowledge as modular to support development
of non-modular products in externally focused product systems is
critical and made possible through use of external reference points
or analogies. Generally speaking, other reference points used in the
biotech sector include drug re-purposing i.e. the use of the results
of a failed development program in another project, or the use of
successful project results in a new project (e.g. Cavalla et al., 1997).
There is also a stage-by-stage process of gaining externaliza-
tion experience – and of learning by doing – that is inherent in
the development of the externally focused product system inte-
grator. This study shows how this may  require the product system
integrator to start with less complex knowledge areas to gain conﬁ-
dence and legitimacy, before moving on to more complex projects.
Our study ﬁndings are in line with prior work that found that
accessing valuable external work is likely to require experimen-
tation and experiential feedback – of learning by doing through
trial and error (e.g. Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995; Brown and
Eisenhardt, 1997). We  also found that because of the ambiguity of
knowledge, the ﬁrm resolved knowledge-product linkage uncer-
tainty by applying technology in different applications through
different partnerships.
There are some key boundary conditions. The externally focused
strategy relies for its success on the availability of the special-
ized ﬁrms in a well-organized innovation ecosystem, in sufﬁcient
quantity and range to meet the needs of systems integration (e.g.
Mowery and Sampat, 2005). Typically product system integrators
in the biotech sector create value by taking very early stage IP from
universities and public research laboratories and forming drug dis-
covery and development companies to develop the IP further. Other
specialist biotech suppliers and service ﬁrms provide complemen-
tary capabilities. Although product system integrators may  differ
in their strategies to develop their partner networks, they all need
quality IP inputs from willing (usually public sector sources) part-
ners and cost effective scientiﬁc infrastructures (e.g. Owen-Smith
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t al., 2002). In addition, the increasing availability of experienced
ut of work pharmaceutical industry managers has also helped sys-
em integrators with experienced hires that help to build capabili-
ies for outsourcing complex R&D (e.g. Powell and Sandholtz, 2011).
A key difference for the externally focused strategy vis a vis the
onventional internally focused strategy is that externally focused
roduct system integrators develop partners for a long term game.
artnerships are stable and enduring because the reliance of the
roduct system integrator on its partners does not diminish sig-
iﬁcantly as in the ﬁrst strategy approach. To engage prospective
artners for the long haul, the product system integrator plays a
eadership role that involves motivating prospective partners and
xciting them about the technology, and building their conﬁdence
y sharing the prospects of what they can achieve together when
haring their IP and working collaboratively.
We found that both product system integrator’s knowledge
trategies align the coordinating elements – clarity of roles and
elegation of decision rights, communication and conducive social
onding in a way that handles effectively the density of transac-
ional knowledge ﬂows in the system. In both cases, the product
ystem integrator’s work is decomposed into projects or contracts.
owever, as we explain above, the clarity of roles and delegation
f decision rights is different.
Effective communication and social bonding builds relational
apital that helps to curb opportunistic behavior and thus prevent
eakage of critical know how between partners (e.g. Kale et al.,
000). However, there are limits to their effectiveness. Solving the
roblems of coordinating mechanisms does not obviate the need
or the systems integrator to always take appropriate measures
o protect its IP, such as adopting a strong patenting strategy.
owever, sharing core IP with partners should not necessarily
lace the ﬁrm at risk because it also depends on the nature of
he sharing involved. First, the ﬁrm does not have to share all of
he core knowledge at once to any one partner – this reduces the
artner’s ability to appropriate the value of the IP (e.g. Liebeskind,
996). Second, the timing of sharing can also be used as a defensive
echanism: research has shown that it is better to share IP with
igger companies at later rather that earlier product develop-
ent stages (e.g. Katila et al., 2008). Effective management and
efense of IP also requires the right backdrop, provided by formal
rafting of contracts to deliver a credible alignment of incentives
e.g. offering performance based rewards), and risk mitigation
easures with acceptable deal terms that will encourage different
ey stakeholders to work together. All this also depends on there
eing a strong IP regime in place in the country.
Finally, in this study we proposed a product systems lens as
uperior to explain how different but competing product sys-
ems work (e.g. Prencipe et al., 2003). We  argued that successful
nowledge integration is a systems integration capability that is
est understood in terms of how it integrates, in our case prod-
ct development stages, the network structure and coordination
echanisms. Our contribution lies in conceiving each product sys-
em as a learning trajectory with different dependencies within
he system related to the learning objective within its alliances.
he learning objectives i.e. transfer partner knowledge (e.g. Cohen
nd Levinthal, 1990) or access partner knowledge (e.g. Grant and
aden-Fuller, 2004) are so predominant that they result in differ-
nt but competing product systems. Our study has shown how and
hy the system components – the ﬁrm’s knowledge and prod-
ct architecture, network structure and coordination mechanisms
ave to align consistently with each knowledge or learning strat-
gy to be successful. Therefore, a hybrid system – consisting of both
roduct systems within a single ﬁrm would be untenable. Either
roduct system represents two distinct ways in which internal and
xternal knowledge may  be used in a complementary manner for
uccessful knowledge integration – thus representing two  differentrch Policy 45 (2016) 1031–1045
hybridization strategies of how and why  internal and external
knowledge integration may  work (e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers,
2006). In the ﬁrst strategy, external knowledge is incorporated to
spur internal efforts, whilst in the second strategy the focal ﬁrm
uses internal knowledge to direct and shape and exploit external
efforts.
Conventional knowledge theories that emphasize the pri-
macy of core R&D or core capabilities being kept in-house (e.g.
Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), under-explore and under-value the
fact that ﬁrms with low knowledge bases can be competitive if they
view their advantage from a system perspective (e.g. Lorenzoni
and Baden-Fuller, 1995). The systems capability develops an inter-
nally consistent product system that relates the product system
integrator’s knowledge base to the network structure and rele-
vant coordination mechanisms required in order to be competitive.
Viewed in this way, the systems integration capability may  be
viewed as a higher order capability that underpins a systems inte-
grator’s competitive advantage.
The study also highlights important implications for managers
and policy. The spawning of start-ups in high tech sectors in gen-
eral – and biotechnologies in particular – has been driven in large
part by policy measures and regulations supporting spin-outs from
public laboratories and academic units, and thus easing the way for
funding from the venture capital sector (e.g. Mowery and Sampat,
2005; Owen-Smith et al., 2002; Powell and Sandholtz, 2011). Our
study shows that these well-meaning policy measures to com-
mercialize technology from academic and public research labs will
often demand that speciﬁc knowledge integration capabilities are
deployed to develop new cutting edge products successfully – a
point that has not been highlighted in prior research.
As with most studies, ours suffers from limitations, which in turn
point to opportunities for future research. Our study focuses solely
on the biotechnology sector, and our two  case ﬁrms were involved
in innovative research and the use of biotechnologies in developing
drugs, using minor equity and contract alliances to access cutting-
edge technology at various product development phases. Not only
did these ﬁrms operate in the same sector, they were in the same
jurisdiction and were of similar size and age. While these factors
all serve to reduce any differential impact, this similarity decreases
the generalizability of our ﬁndings to other industries, which will
require identifying how similar knowledge integration processes
work in other industry settings.
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